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I. INTRODUCTION
Twice last year the Supreme Court interpreted criminal statutes that were
silent or ambiguous about the culpable mental state associated with a particular
objective element. In the first case, Dean v. United States,' the statute at issue was
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), which defines an aggravated version of the offense
of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence.2 This section requires the
government to prove that the defendant's firearm was "discharged" during the
crime of violence.3 But it does not make any mention of a mental state associated
with the discharge element.4 In Dean, the defendant's firearm appeared to have
discharged accidentally. 5 And so the question arose whether the government was
required to prove a mental state with respect to the discharge, and if so which one.
The defendant argued that the government was required to prove that he had
* Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. I am very grateful to Deborah Denno and
Ernest Johnson for their comments on an earlier version of this article.
1 129 S. Ct. 1849 (2009).
2 See id. at 1852-53. Technically, this section defines a "sentencing factor" enhancement,
rather than a separate offense. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 553 (2002); see also Reply
Brief of Petitioner at 4-5, Dean, 129 S. Ct. 1849 (No. 08-5274) (acknowledging that the district court
judge, rather than the jury, was responsible for deciding whether the discharge element in
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) had been proved). This distinction has important procedural consequences. See
Harris, 536 U.S. at 552-53. From a substantive perspective, though, the sentencing factor
enhancement in § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) does exactly what many offense elements do: trigger harsher
penalties for more serious criminal conduct. See Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1855 (comparing the discharge
provision to the felony-murder rule, in which proof that the defendant caused the victim's death
results in the imposition of increased punishment, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). The Court
in Dean, accordingly, appears to have assigned no substantive significance to the fact that the
discharge provision defines a sentencing factor enhancement, rather than a separate offense. See,
e.g., id. at 1855-56 (explaining why the presumption of scienter does not require the assignment of a
mental state to the discharge provision, and so tacitly rejecting the government's argument, set out in
Brief for the United States at 10, Dean, 129 S. Ct. 1849 (No. 08-5274), that the presumption of
scienter does not apply at all to sentencing enhancements).
3 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).
4 See id.
s 129 S. Ct. at 1852 (explaining that Dean had cursed and run out of the bank after the gun
went off, and that witnesses to the robbery had later testified that "he seemed surprised that the gun
had gone off').
6 Id. at 1852-53.
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discharged the gun intentionally or knowingly.7  The government argued that
Congress had meant, by its silence, not to require any mental state at all with
respect to the discharge element.
The question in the second case, Flores-Figueroa v. United States,9 took
much the same form. The statute at issue in Flores-Figueroa was 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1), which defines an aggravated form of identity theft.o This statute
requires the government to prove that the defendant, in the course of committing
any of several predicate offenses, knowingly used or possessed "a means of
identification [belonging to] another person."" In Flores-Figueroa, everyone
agreed that the defendant had presented his employer with counterfeit social
security and alien registration cards, and that the numbers on these cards were
assigned to other people.12 But the defendant insisted that he had not known-or
at least that the government could not prove he had known-"that the numbers on
the counterfeit documents were numbers assigned to other people."' And so the
question arose whether the statutory mental state, "knowingly," extended to the
"belonging" element.14  The defendant argued that it did.' The government
argued that the "belonging" element had no associated mental state at all.'6
The government prevailed in Dean;7 the defendant in Flores-Figueroa.'8
Neither outcome is very interesting. What is interesting about the cases is how
little help the Court got from the criminal law in resolving these quintessential
criminal law questions. In Flores-Figueroa, the Court's interpretation of the
statute was based exclusively on what the Court described as rules of "ordinary
English grammar." 9 In Dean, the Court's interpretation of the statute was based,
first, on textual cues-on the statute's use of the passive voice2 0 and on the
statute's omission of any explicit reference to mens rea21-and, second, on a
7 Id. at 1854.
8 Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 10.
9 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009).
'o Id. at 1888.
" 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006).
12 129 S. Ct. at 1889.
14 Id.
'4 Id at 1888-89.
15 Id. at 1889.
16 Id.
" 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2009).
18 129 S. Ct. at 1894.
Id. at 1890.
20 129 S. Ct. at 1853 ("Congress's use of the passive voice further indicates that subsection
(iii) does not require proof of intent.").
21 Id. (assigning weight to the fact that the text "does not require that the discharge be done
knowingly or intentionally, or otherwise contain words of limitation").
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statute-specific analysis of the element's function.22 Only as an afterthought did
the Court in Dean say anything about criminal law doctrine. And what it said,
ultimately, was that the doctrinal principle invoked by Dean-the "presumption
that criminal prohibitions include a requirement that the [g]overnment prove the
defendant intended the conduct made criminal"-was not implicated.23
The Court's neglect of the criminal law in these cases cannot be ascribed to
a dearth of relevant criminal law doctrine. Legislatures routinely fail to specify the
mental states associated with objective elements, and so the question whether a
particular element requires a mental state routinely falls to the courts. 24  In
resolving this question, courts traditionally have drawn on a rich-if somewhat
untidy-body of "background principles," 25  whose primary function is to
distinguish elements that require mental states from elements that don't.2 6 Some
courts, for example, have made use of a distinction between elements that define
the "proscribed act" and elements that define "additional consequence[s]." 27 Some
22 Id. (arguing that the discharge element, because it concerns "whether something
happened-not how or why it happened," is non-causal and requires no mental state).
23 Id. at 1855.
24 See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REv.
469, 477 (1996) ("Congress is notoriously careless about defining the mental state element of
criminal offenses.").
25 See United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 1998) (Sotomayor, J.)
(identifying distinction between objective elements that make conduct criminal and objective
elements that make criminal conduct worse as one of the "background principles that operate in the
criminal law").
26 The Model Penal Code famously takes the view that every objective element in every
criminal statute requires an associated mental state. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (1985). Even
in those states whose criminal codes most closely track the Model Penal Code, however, courts have
proven reluctant to enforce this view. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 668 P.2d 829, 835 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983) (holding that no culpable mental state attaches to the age element in statute defining offense of
aggravated prostitution); People v. Mitchell, 571 N.E.2d 701, 704 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that no
culpable mental state attaches to the value element in statute defining the crime of aggravated theft);
State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361, 366 (Or. 2007) (holding that no culpable mental state attaches to the
distance element in Oregon statute prohibiting the delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet
of a school). The courts' reluctance is understandable, moreover, at least where so-called "general-
intent offenses" are concerned. See Eric A. Johnson, Mens Rea for Sexual Abuse: The Case for
Defining the Acceptable Risk, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 11-20 (2009). In any event, this
paper will suppose, as courts do, that some elements require mental states and some do not.
27 See, e.g., People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 378 (Cal. 1969). In substance, the "proscribed
act" encompasses every objective element that falls short of the ultimate harm at which the statute is
targeted. See, e.g., People v. Overman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 798, 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that
the discharge element in a statute prohibiting the negligent discharge of a firearm is part of the
proscribed act, rather than an additional consequence). In contrast, an element will count as an
"additional consequence" if it measures the social harm at which the statute is targeted. See, e.g.,
People v. Hesslink, 213 Cal. Rptr. 465, 470-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the element of
"obtain[ing] property of another" in extortion statute qualified as an "additional consequence").
Courts have made use of this distinction-and of the derivative distinction between general-intent
and specific-intent crimes-in deciding whether particular elements require mental states. See, e.g.,
United States v. Zunie, 444 F.3d 1230, 1233-35 (10th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that because crime of
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courts have made use of a distinction between elements that make conduct criminal.
and elements that make criminal conduct more serious.28 And some courts have
made use of the Model Penal Code's threefold division of elements into conduct,
results, and attendant circumstances.2 9 In all of these distinctions among objective
elements, the courts have found guidance in resolving the question that the Court
faced in Dean and Flores-Figueroa-namely, what mental state, if any, a
particular element requires.
Nor can the Court's failure to look to the criminal law for help be attributed,
in either Dean or Flores-Figueroa, to the availability of clear guidance in the
statutory text itself. True, "[t]here are certainly cases in which grammar and
punctuation suggest a clear answer to a question of [criminal] statutory
interpretation." 30 And so there are criminal cases where resort to criminal law
background principles is simply unnecessary. But neither Dean nor Flores-
Figueroa was such a case. In both cases, the statutes contained just the kinds of
ambiguities-silence about mens rea, in Dean, and uncertain adverbial scope, in
Flores-Figueroa-that courts traditionally have treated as an invitation to resort to
criminal law background principles for guidance. 3 1
In both cases, the Court's emphasis on the statutory text, rather than on
criminal law background principles, was really the product of an unstated choice
between two starkly different approaches to statutory interpretation. The first
approach, in Jeremy Waldron's words, "[makes] doctrinal systematicity the point
"assault resulting in serious bodily injury is a general intent" offense, it does not require proof that
defendant actually intended to cause serious bodily injury); Seymore v. State, 152 P.3d 401, 406
(Wyo. 2007) (reasoning that because "escape is a general intent crime," it does not require a mental
state with respect to the ultimate harm at which the statute is targeted, namely, the evasion ofjustice).
For a general discussion of this troublesome distinction, see Eric A. Johnson, Making Sense of
General and Specific Intent: Eight Things I Know for Sure (Sept. 11, 2008) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
28 See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1994) (holding that
presumption of scienter applies "to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent
conduct" and identifying "the age of the performers" in child pornography statute as an "element
separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct"); United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th
Cir. 2001) (holding that no mental state need be proved with respect to the age element in statute that
prohibits transporting minors across state lines for prostitution, since "the age of the victim simply
subjects the defendant to a more severe penalty").
29 See, e.g., People v. Douglas, 886 N.E.2d 1232, 1237-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (distinguishing
"voluntary act," which "must be accompanied by a culpable mental state," from crime's "attendant
circumstances," which "do not require a mental state," in holding that "the age of the accused and the
age of the victim [in Illinois's sexual-assault statute] are attendant circumstances that do not require
an associated mental state"); State v. Walker, 915 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that,
in prosecution for delivering a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school, the state was not
required to prove a culpable mental state with respect to the distance element, since "the location of
the offense . .. [was] not an act, but an attendant circumstance of the underlying criminal conduct of
delivery of a controlled substance").
30 Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 115.
31 See infra text accompanying notes 128 to 152.
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of reference for judicial reasoning." 3 2  This approach is at work when courts
invoke substantive, criminal law background principles to resolve the question
what mental state, if any, a particular element requires. The second, alternative
approach, again in Waldron's words, focuses not on relevant doctrine, but on "the
text of the latest piece of legislation." 3 3 This approach was at work in Dean and
Flores-Figueroa, where-for all the help it got from the criminal law-the Court
might as well have been interpreting statutes about retirement benefits or
environmental protection. Moreover, the Court's choice of the second approach in
Dean and Flores-Figueroa, if unstated, does not appear to have been unconsidered.
In Flores-Figueroa in particular, the Court went beyond mere neglect of doctrine
to active disparagement. It dismissed as a "legal cliche" 34 the background
principle that "ignorance of the law is no excuse,"35 for example. And it
misrepresented two of its own past decisions as triumphs of plain meaning over
background principles.
My primary aim in this paper will be to make explicit the choice behind the
Court's analyses in Dean and Flores-Figueroa. For comparison's sake, I will
begin by describing the traditional, doctrine-centered approach to criminal
statutory interpretation. This approach has a long history, but nowhere is better
illustrated than in Justice (then Judge) Sotomayor's first opinion as a judge of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals: United States v. Figueroa.38 In Figueroa, as in
Dean and Flores-Figueroa, the question was what mental state, if any, was
attached to a particular element.39 In answering this question, though, Justice
Sotomayor refused to rely either on the statute's grammar or on its legislative
history. Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, she said she preferred to rely
on "[t]he principles of construction underlying the criminal law."40
The first part of this paper, then, will use Justice Sotomayor's opinion for
the Second Circuit in Figueroa as a vehicle for exploring the traditional, doctrine-
centered approach to criminal statutory interpretation. The second part of this
paper will show where the Supreme Court's decisions in Dean and Flores-
Figueroa depart from this traditional approach.
Finally, in the third part of this paper, I will argue very briefly that both
Dean and Flores-Figueroa illustrate shortcomings in the non-doctrinal, text-
32 Jeremy Waldron, "Transcendental Nonsense" and System in the Law, 100 CoLuM. L. REv.
16, 36 (2000).
3 Id. at 37.
3 Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1891 (2009).
36 See id. (discussing Liparota v. United States, 417 U.S. 419 (1985), and United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994)).
3 See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-63 (1952).
3 165 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
39 Id. at 113-14.
40 Id. at 119.
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centered approach to criminal statutory interpretation. First, I will argue that even
the statute at issue in Flores-Figueroa belies the Court's insistence, in Flores-
Figueroa itself, that resort to background principles is necessary only in "special
contexts."41  Second, I will argue that the Court's analysis in Dean of the
"discharge" element in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) founders precisely because the
Court ignores the relevant doctrinal background. This paper will not, however,
offer anything like a comprehensive defense of the doctrine-centered approach to
criminal statutory interpretation, nor will it develop a systematic account of
existing criminal law background principles. Both of these are topics for other
papers.
II. THE DOCTRINE-CENTERED APPROACH: UNITED STATES V. FIGUEROA
The doctrine-centered approach to criminal statutory interpretation has two
defining characteristics. The first is the courts' readiness, under this approach, to
conclude that the statute itself leaves important questions unanswered. The second
is the courts' assumption that these unanswered questions are best resolved by the
systematic application of criminal law doctrine-rather than by, say, an ad hoc,
statute-specific analysis of the policies at stake. In this section, I will treat these
two facets of the doctrine-centered approach in order.
A. Readiness to Treat Criminal Statutes as Incomplete
The first defining characteristic of the doctrine-centered approach could be
described as a readiness to treat criminal statutes as "half-formed.'4 2  In a
particular case, the perceived incompleteness of the statute might be attributable to
ambiguity, or it might be attributable to vagueness or what philosophers call "open
texture." But the critical thing is that the statute's text is thought,
unproblematically, to leave important questions unanswered. Justice Sotomayor's
opinion for the Second Circuit in United States v. Figueroa" illustrates this
readiness to treat criminal statutes as incomplete.
41 Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1891.
42 Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 127, 153 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Ignorance ofLaw] ("[T]he truth ... is that criminal statutes
typically emerge from the legislature only half-formed and must be completed through contentious,
norm-laden modes of interpretation that are functionally indistinguishable from common-law
making."); see also Kahan, supra note 24, at 470 (arguing that "judicial invention" in the
interpretation of federal criminal statutes "does not reflect a lawless usurpation of legislative
prerogative; rather, it is a response to the deliberate incompleteness of the criminal statutes that
Congress enacts"); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2387, 2469 (2003)
(acknowledging that criminal statutes sometimes "do[] not spell out every detail").
43 See Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 181-88, 193-
202 (1981) (explaining the differences between ambiguity, vagueness, and open texture).
4 165 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
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The statute at issue in Figueroa was 8 U.S.C. § 1327, which then applied to
"[a]ny person who knowingly aids or assists any alien excludable under [8 U.S.C.
§] 11 82(a)(2) (insofar as an alien excludable under such section has been convicted
of an aggravated felony) . . . to enter the United States."45 The defendant in the
case, Figueroa, was an inspector for the Immigration and Naturalization Service
who had helped an alien, Garcia, to enter the country illegally.46 There was no
doubt that Garcia was excludable under § 1182(a)(2) by virtue of a prior
aggravated felony conviction-he had served three years for kidnapping.47 Nor
does there appear to have been any real doubt that Figueroa knew that Garcia was
48
excludable. But the evidence did not suggest that Figueroa knew why Garcia
was excludable.4 9 And so the question arose whether the statutory mental state,
"knowingly," extended to the reason why the alien was excludable.so Figueroa
argued that it did; he argued that the government "should have been required to
[show] that he knew Garcia was excludable because of his prior aggravated felony
conviction."5 The government argued that no mental state attached to the reason
why Garcia was excludable.52
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Figueroa urged the court to resolve the
interpretive question on the basis of the mental-state adverb's position within the
statute. He argued that "the English language"54 and its rules of "accepted
sentence structure"55 required that the word "'knowingly' . . . be read to modify all
the elements of the crime, including the precise nature of the alien's excludable
status."56 He argued, in other words, that his interpretation "comport[ed] with the
'most natural grammatical reading' of the statute."57
But Justice Sotomayor rejected Figueroa's grammatical argument. "In the
case of statutes like this," she said, "where a mental state adverb can modify some
or all of the remaining words in a sentence, neither grammar nor punctuation
resolves the question of how much knowledge Congress intended to be sufficient
45 8 U.S.C. § 1327 (1994) (amended 1996); see also Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 114 & n.2 (reciting
the then-applicable statute and describing reason for amendment to the statute).
46 Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 113.
47 id.
48 See id (describing Figueroa's signals to, and lack of substantive questioning of, Garcia).
49 id.
50 See id at 114.
SId. at 113.
52 Id. at 116.
5 Id. at 115.
54 Reply Brief for Appellant Ancelmo Figueroa at 1, Figueroa, 165 F.3d Il 1 (No. 98-1111).
ss Id. at 2 (arguing that the government, "[i]n urging that 'knowingly' modifies only part of
the phrase which it heads 'aids and assisting any alien excludable under Section 1 I82(a)(2)[,'] does
violence to accepted sentence structure").
56 Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 115.
57 Id. (citation omitted).
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for a conviction."58 Why not? Part of the reason, no doubt, is that statutes like
these often are genuinely ambiguous as a matter of English grammar.59 On this
point, Justice Sotomayor quoted Professor Wayne LaFave, who said of a similar
statute that, "[a]s a matter of grammar the statute is ambiguous; it is not at all clear
how far down the sentence the word 'knowingly' is intended to travel."6 o
But there is more than grammatical ambiguity behind the courts'
readiness-under the doctrine-centered approach-to treat the scope of mental-
state adverbs as indeterminate. In Figueroa, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged,
parenthetically, that mental-state adverbs sometimes are treated as indeterminate
even when the statute's grammar, punctuation, or structure appears to define the
adverb's scope.6 She quoted the Second Circuit's 1991 decision in United States
v. Morris62 for the proposition that "with many statutes, a mental state adverb
adjacent to initial words has been applied to phrases or clauses appearing later in
the statute without regard to the punctuation or structure of the statute."63
Just how far courts will go in ignoring grammatical and structural cues is
illustrated by the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc.64 In X-Citement Video, as in Figueroa, the question was how far down
the sentence the mental-state adverb "knowingly" was meant to travel.6 5  In X-
Citement Video, though, the statute's text appeared to answer this question. The
statute, which prohibited the interstate transportation or shipment of child
pornography, provided, in relevant part:
(a) Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate commerce or foreign
commerce by any means including by computer or mails, any visual
depiction, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
58 Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 115.
s9 See Richmond H. Thomason & Robert C. Stalnaker, A Semantic Theory of Adverbs, 4
LINGUISTIC INQUIRY 195, 217 (1973) (explaining why "[w]ord order in English is not in general a
very reliable clue to adverbial scope").
6 Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 115 n.6 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. ScoTT JR.,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 27, at 193 (1972)); see also Kahan, supra note 24 ("When
[Congress] does address the issue [of mens real, it often speaks ambiguously, failing to specify, for
example, which clauses in a long and convoluted string are modified by the term 'knowingly."').
61 Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 115.
62 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
63 Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 115 (quoting Morris, 928 F.2d at 507).
' 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
65 Id. at 68.
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. . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.6 6
The Court acknowledged, rightly, that "[t]he most natural grammatical
reading [of this statute] . . . suggests that the term 'knowingly' modifies only the
surrounding verbs."6 The Court also acknowledged that "[u]nder this
construction, the word 'knowingly' would not modify the elements of the minority
of the performers, or the sexually explicit nature of the material, because they are
set forth in independent clauses separated by interruptive punctuation."68 But the
Court read the word "knowingly" to modify these elements anyway. The Court
said that when the statute was read against the backdrop of criminal faw
convention, the "plain language reading of [18 U.S.C.] § 2252 is not so plain" after
all.69 In short, the Court proved ready to treat this seemingly unambiguous statute
as ambiguous; it proved ready to treat the adverb's scope as indeterminate.
Courts have proven equally ready to treat criminal statutes as incomplete
where the statute fails to specify any mental state at all. Ordinarily, a statute's
omission of any reference to a particular fact or element would be treated as
unambiguous; the courts, after all, "ordinarily resist reading words or elements into
a statute that do not appear on its face."o But a statute that is silent about mens rea
usually is treated, under the doctrine-centered approach, simply as leaving the
question of mens rea unanswered. It has been settled at least since the Court's
1952 decision in Morissette v. United States7 "that mere omission from [a criminal
statute] of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element
from the crimes denounced." 7 2 Thus, where a statute is silent about the mental
state associated with a particular element, the answer to the mens rea question must
come from somewhere else-from an analysis of "the nature of the statute," 73
perhaps, or from "the background rules of the common law." 74
This is not to say, of course, that the doctrine-centered approach forecloses
the possibility that the words of the statute will carry clear answers to questions of
criminal statutory interpretation. In Figueroa, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged
66 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
67 X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 68.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 7 1.
70 Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997) (declining to interpret criminal statute to
require a specific "intent to defraud").
7' 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
72 Id. at 263; see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978) (holding
that "far more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is
necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement").
7 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 (1994).
74 Id. at 605.
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that "[t]here are certainly cases in which grammar and punctuation suggest a clear
answer to a question of statutory interpretation." And in Morissette, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that even the criminal law's strong presumption against strict
liability "would not justify judicial disregard of a clear command [dispensing with
mens rea] from Congress."7 The courts' readiness to treat criminal statutes as
incomplete is a matter of degree, but no less real for that.
B. The Resort to Doctrine
The second defining feature of the doctrine-centered approach is the courts'
assumption that questions left unanswered by the statute's text usually are best
resolved by the systematic application of criminal law doctrine-rather than by,
say, an ad hoc, statute-specific analysis of the policies at stake.
Justice Sotomayor's opinion in United States v. Figueroa illustrates this turn
to doctrine. Immediately after rejecting Figueroa's textual argument-and so
concluding that the text was ambiguous-Justice Sotomayor said that "courts often
discern congressional intent by reading the text in light of the legal principles that
operate in the relevant area of the law."78 For this proposition, she relied on United
States v. United States Gypsum Co.,79 where the Supreme Court had said that
"Congress will be presumed to have legislated against the background of our
traditional legal concepts."80 Justice Sotomayor would return to this same theme
again later, when she rejected Figueroa's appeal to the statute's ambiguous
legislative history.8' "The principles of construction underlying the criminal law,"
she said, "serve as much better signposts to congressional intent in these kinds of
circumstances than a statute's sparse and inconsistent legislative history. 82In
other words, the best guide to congressional intent is "the background principles
that operate in the criminal law."8 3
The remainder of the opinion is devoted to the careful development of these
background principles. In particular, Justice Sotomayor articulated a distinction
between two kinds of objective elements: (1) elements that "separat[e] legal
innocence from wrongful conduct" and (2) elements that separate wrongful
7s United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998).
76 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 254 n.14.
7 Cf Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406 (1998) (Scalia, J.) (acknowledging
difference between (1) the application of "well defined (or even newly enunciated), generally
applicable, [criminal law] background principles of assumed legislative intent" and (2) the creation of
"case-by-case exceptions" to "criminal statutes").
7 Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 115.
7 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
so Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 115 (quoting U S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437).
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conduct from worse conduct. 84 She used this distinction to define the limits of the
traditional presumption against strict liability." "Absent clear congressional intent
to the contrary," she said, "statutes defining federal crimes are . .. normally read to
contain a mens rea requirement that attaches to enough elements of the crime that
together would be sufficient to constitute an act in violation of the law."" In other
words, the presumption against strict liability usually requires that a mental state
be assigned to elements "that make [the] conduct illegal,"87 but does not require
that a mental state be assigned to elements that make the conduct a worse crime.
In Figueroa itself, the critical element-the excludable alien's prior felony
conviction-just made the defendant's crime worse, so the element required no
culpable mental state.
This distinction-between elements that make the conduct illegal and
elements that make the crime worse-was not novel even in 1998. The Supreme
Court had hinted before at the same distinction in Staples v. United States,89 for
example, where it said that the presumption against strict liability requires the
government to prove some mental state with respect to all "the facts that make
[the] conduct illegal."90 In United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,91 too, the Court
said that the presumption against strict liability applies only to "elements that
criminalize otherwise innocent conduct." 92 What is unique about Figueroa is the
84 Id. at 117 (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994)).
8 See United States v. Taylor, 937 F.2d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v.
Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) ("[T]he presumption against strict liability states that
'absent evidence of a contrary legislative intent, courts should presume mens rea is required."').
86 Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 116.
87 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994); see also United States v. Crimmins, 123
F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir. 1941) (L. Hand, J.) (distinguishing general-intent offenses, which require
proof that the defendant was "aware of the existence of all those facts which make his conduct
criminal," from strict-liability offenses, which do not).
8 Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 118. It is possible to quarrel with Justice Sotomayor's application of
this limitation on the presumption of scienter. In Figueroa, the critical distinction-between
elements that make conduct criminal and elements that make criminal conduct more serious--does
not function merely as a limitation on the presumption of scienter. Rather, it functions as the trigger
of a reverse presumption, in which aggravating elements are presumed not to require mental states.
This reverse presumption is probably indefensible.
89 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
90 Id. at 619; id. at 618-19 ("[W]here . . . dispensing with mens rea would require the
defendant to have knowledge only of traditionally lawful conduct," and Congress has attached a
severe penalty to a crime, "the usual presumption that a defendant must know the facts that make his
conduct illegal should apply.").
91 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
92 Id at 72. The Court eventually would speak more clearly on this question in Carter v.
United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000), where it said that "[tihe presumption in favor of scienter requires
a court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from
'otherwise innocent conduct."' Id. at 269 (quoting X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72). The Supreme
Court's announcements on this score remain sufficiently opaque, though, as to permit the editors of
the Harvard Law Review to characterize the distinction "between innocent and non-innocent
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degree of rigor Justice Sotomayor brought to the articulation of this distinction.
She first traced this distinction through a series of Supreme Court decisions, then
traced the same distinction through the decisions of the federal courts of appeals
before finally applying it to the statute at issue in Figueroa's case.93 The focus
throughout the opinion is on the articulation of doctrinal principles.
Almost as telling as what Justice Sotomayor said in Figueroa is what she
didn't say. What she didn't say was much of anything about the specific purposes
of the statute at issue in Figueroa's case, 8 U.S.C. § 1327, or about the practical
implications of the interpretation urged upon the court by Figueroa. She did not
say, for example-though she reasonably could have-that requiring the
government to prove the actor's knowledge of the alien's aggravated felony
conviction would make the statute practically unenforceable. Nor did she
speculate about why, exactly, a person who unlawfully helps a felon enter the
country (in violation of § 1327) should be subject to greater punishment than a
person who unlawfully helps an otherwise excludable alien enter the country (in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324). Her only detour into specifics was when she said
that § 1327 "generates incentives for [persons who unlawfully help aliens to enter
the country] to find out whether they are assisting an alien felon into the country
and to avoid aiding aliens in this narrow class."94 But this detour was followed, in
the very next sentence, by a reminder that her conclusions about the statute really
"were derived from presumptions inherent in the criminal law."95
Why, then, does Justice Sotomayor suppose that the generalities of criminal
law doctrine-or "the background principles [of] the criminal law," 96 as she puts
it-provide a surer guide to congressional intent than does the grammar of the
statute, or the statute's specific purposes? One possible answer-the textualist's
answer, presumably-would be that the criminal law's background principles
provide a kind of codebook for "decoding" the statute's text.9 7 On this view, the
text of the statute does have a determinate meaning. This determinate meaning,
though, can be ascertained only through the application of "prevailing interpretive
conventions" 98 like the presumption against strict liability. Thus, Professor John
Manning has argued that "textualists read mens rea requirements into otherwise
underlying conduct" as a product of the lower courts' misinterpretation of Supreme Court precedent.
The Supreme Court 2008 Term-Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REv. 153, 319-20 (2009).
9 Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 115-18.
94 Id. at 1 19.
9 Id.
96 Id.
9 See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REv. 419, 432-33
(2005) (arguing that "the demands of legislative supremacy require only that legislators intend to
enact a law that will be decoded according to prevailing interpretive conventions").
98 Id.
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unqualified criminal statutes because established judicial practice calls for
interpreting such statutes in light of common law mental state requirements." 99
Whatever the virtues of this account, it does not track what Justice
Sotomayor actually did in Figueroa, or for that matter what courts do generally in
similar cases. 00 The statute interpreted in Figueroa, 8 U.S.C. § 1327, was adopted
in 1952, and then amended in 1988 and 1990.101 But Justice Sotomayor made no
effort to ascertain what the "prevailing interpretive conventions" were as of any of
those dates. Rather, her articulation of the relevant background principles-and in
particular of the distinction between elements that make conduct criminal and
elements that make criminal conduct worse-was based almost entirely on case
law from after 1990. She relied heavily on Staples v. United States'02 and United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,103 both of which were decided by the Supreme
Court in 1994.104 And she relied, too, on a 1994 decision of the Second Circuit'05
and on a 1996 decision of the Fourth Circuit.106  She was not, then, trying to
determine what the words of the statute's text would have meant in 1952 or 1990
to "a reasonable person, conversant with the applicable conventions."0 7
What Justice Sotomayor actually did in Figueroa might be better described
as an exercise of "delegated common law-making" authority. 0 8  Professor Dan
Kahan has argued that Congress, by "enacting incompletely specified criminal
statutes . . . implicitly transfer[s] lawmaking authority to the judiciary."' 09
"[C]riminal statutes typically emerge from the legislature only half-formed,"i'o and
so the courts bear the responsibility for "formulating the mediating principles and
99 Manning, supra note 42, at 2466.
'00 See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406 (1998) (Scalia, J.) (acknowledging that the
interpretation of criminal statutes sometimes is guided by "background interpretive principle[s] of
general application" even where those principles are "newly enunciated").
101 See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 277, 66 Stat. 163, 229-30
(1952); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7346, 102 Stat. 4181, 4471 (1988);
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 543(b)(4), 603(a)(16), 104 Stat. 4978, 5059, 5084
(1990); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1327 (1994).
102 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
103 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
'0 See United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111, 115-18 (2d Cir. 1998).
105 Id. at 117-18 (discussing United States v. LaPorta, 46 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 1994)).
106 Id. at 118 (discussing United States v. Cook, 76 F.3d 596 (4th Cir. 1996)).
107 Manning, supra note 97, at 434.
108 Kahan, supra note 24, at 470 (arguing that "federal criminal law, as a whole, is best
conceptualized as a regime of delegated common law-making").
109 Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 345, 372
[hereinafter Kahan, Crimes]; see also Kahan, supra note 24, at 470 (arguing that "judicial invention"
in the interpretation of federal criminal statutes "is a response to the deliberate incompleteness of the
criminal statutes").
o10 Kahan, Ignorance ofLaw, supra note 42, at 153.
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doctrines necessary to bring these statutes to bear on real-world facts."'11 In
making the case for this account of criminal statutory interpretation, Professor
Kahan focuses primarily on the criminal law's special part. He argues, for
example, that courts have "filled out the [federal] mail fraud statute by devising a
cluster of special rules on the nexus between the scheme to defraud and the
mailing,"1 2 and that the courts, in implementing the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act, have "devised an elaborate set of doctrinal tests and
definitions."" 3
But courts exercise the same law-making power with respect to the criminal
law's general part. Consider, for example, how the courts implement the
requirement of causation. The requirement of causation is statutory, of course;
homicide statutes, for example, typically require the government to prove that the
actor "caused" the victim's death.1 4 But few criminal codes define the required
causal relationship."' Rather, the law defining the required relationship is
essentially "left to judicial development.""'6  This is not to say that every result-
based criminal statute operates as a specific delegation of law-making authority.
(Courts, after all, do not ordinarily develop statute-specific definitions of
causation.' 1) Nor is it to say, however, that the legislature, in enacting a result-
based criminal statute, incorporates the judge-made law of causation as it existed
when the statute was enacted. The truth lies somewhere in between. Statutes that
make use of the concept of causation are linked, as it were, to an ever-changing
body of judge-made law on the subject of causation.
The same is true where the assignment of mental states is concerned. That
is, where the assignment of mental states is concerned, criminal statutes are linked
to a separate body of law that answers questions left unanswered by the statute
itself. How this works is nicely illustrated by the Model Penal Code, whose
in Kahan, Crimes, supra note 109, at 372-73.
12 Id. at 376.
" Id. at 381.
114 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 2009) (providing that the actor commits
second-degree murder when, "[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death
of such person or of a third person").
us See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 5 (1985) (observing that "[i]n the majority of the
jurisdictions that have adopted or considered revised codes, no explicit provision on causation has
been included").
116 Id. (describing likely effect of causation provision included in draft federal criminal code);
see also State v. David, 141 P.3d 646, 649-52 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing that the
Washington Legislature "has historically left to the judiciary the task of defining some criminal
elements," among them causation).
" See, e.g., David, 141 P.3d at 651 (holding that reference to "proximate causation" in
Washington state's vehicular homicide statute should be interpreted in keeping with generally
applicable judge-made law on the subject of proximate cause). For an interesting counterexample,
see People v. Schaefer, 703 N.W.2d 774, 784 (Mich. 2005), where the Michigan Supreme Court held
that the state's drunk-driving homicide statute did not require a causal nexus between the defendant's
intoxication and the victim's death.
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separate body of interpretive rules tells the courts what mental states to assign to
the objective elements of crimes." 8 Subsection 2.02(4), for example, tells courts
how to resolve ambiguities in the scope of mental-state adverbs-namely, by
applying the mental state "to all the material elements of the offense, unless a
contrary purpose plainly appears."1 9 And subsection 2.02(3) tells courts what
mental state to assign to elements for which no mental state is prescribed by the
statute defining the offense-namely, the mental state of recklessness.120
Congress declined, as did most state legislatures, to adopt counterparts to
Model Penal Code § 2.02.121 But here, as with causation, the effect of Congress's
inaction is merely that the relevant principles are "left to judicial development.,l 22
There is no reason to suppose that Congress meant to forestall the judicial
development of a separate body of interpretive rules, and many reasons to suppose
that it did not. For one thing, the relationship of a criminal statute's mental states
to its objective elements is complex-too complex, probably, to be specified
exhaustively in every statute.12 3 For another, Congress can hardly have meant for
the courts to glean the required information from the statute's legislative history,
"which all too frequently proves elusive on the issue." 24 The better view, then, is
that there is a separate body of interpretive rules-judge-made, and therefore
subject to development over time-that answers the inevitable questions about the
assignment of mental states to elements. The application of this separate body of
interpretive rules sometimes is, paradoxically, a better guide to "congressional
intent" than is the statute's text or legislative history.125
III. THE STATUTE-SPECIFIC APPROACH: FLORES-FIGUEROA V. UNITED STATES AND
DEAN V. UNITED STATES
For the sake of comparison, the Supreme Court's current approach to
criminal statutory interpretation, as reflected in Flores-Figueroa v. United States126
118 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1), (3), (4), (9) (1985).
"9 Id. § 2.02(4).
120 Id. § 2.02(3).
121 See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1975, at
58-61 (Comm. Print 1975) (explaining provisions of proposed federal criminal code (ultimately
rejected) that would have controlled the interpretation of federal statutes with respect to mens rea).
122 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 5 (1985) (describing effect of provision included in draft
federal criminal code).
123 See infra Part IV.A. (arguing that the Supreme Court in Flores-Figueroa underestimated
the complexity of the relationship between a statute's mental states and its objective elements).
124 See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1975, at
58 (Comm. Print 1975).
125 See United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 1998) (arguing that criminal law
doctrine sometimes provides "better signposts to congressional intent" than does a statute's
legislative history).
126 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009).
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and Dean v. United States,12 7 also can be thought of as having two defining
characteristics. The first is a readiness to find clear answers to interpretive
questions in the statute's text. The second is a preference for resolving
unanswered questions without the help of criminal law doctrine.
A. Readiness to Find Clear Meaning in the Text
Both in Dean and in Flores-Figueroa, the Supreme Court found clear
guidance in aspects of the statute's text that would traditionally, under the
doctrine-centered approach to interpretation, have been treated as ambiguous. In
Dean, the Court found guidance in the statute's omission of a mental state.12 8 And
in Flores-Figueroa, the Court found guidance in the positioning of the mental-state
adverb in relation to the critical element.12 9
The statute at issue in Dean, again, requires the government to prove that the
defendant's firearm was discharged during a federal crime of violence or drug-
trafficking crime.130 The question in the case was what culpable mental state, if
any, is associated with the discharge element.131 In concluding that the discharge
element has no associated mental state, the Court relied in part on Congress's
failure to specify a mental state. "[W]e ordinarily resist reading words or elements
into a statute that do not appear on its face," the Court said.13 2
This reference to the statute's silence was not followed, as once it might
have been, by an acknowledgement that "far more than the simple omission of the
appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing
with an intent requirement."' 33  Nor was Congress's silence treated, as once it
might have been, as an invitation to examine "the nature of the statute" and
"construe the statute in light of the background rules of the common law." 34 In
Dean, rather, Congress's silence was treated as an independent, stand-alone reason
for concluding that no mental state was required.135 After making the argument
from Congress's silence, the Court simply turned to the next argument.136
The text played an even more decisive role in Flores-Figueroa. The statute
at issue in Flores-Figueroa, again, applies by its terms to an actor who "knowingly
transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of
123 129 S. Ct. 1849 (2009).
128 Id. at 1853.
129 Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1890-91.
so Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1853 (referring to subsection (iii) of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006)).
'3' id.
132 Id. (quoting Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997)).
133 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,438 (1978).
'3 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 607 (1994).
131 See Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1853.
136 See id.
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another person." 37 The question in the case was whether the "knowingly" mental
state extended to the belonging element-to the fact that the means of
identification belonged to a real person.'38 So the question was-like the question
that faced Justice Sotomayor in Figueroa-a question about adverbial scope. The
Supreme Court's approach to resolving this question, though, could not have been
more different from Justice Sotomayor's.
In concluding that the "knowingly" mental state extends to the statute's
belonging element, the Court relied exclusively on "ordinary English grammar." 3 9
"As a matter of ordinary English grammar," the Court said, "it seems natural to
read the statute's word 'knowingly' as applying to all the subsequently listed
elements of the crime."14 0 For this proposition, the Court relied not on other
criminal law cases but on homely examples from everyday usage:
If a child knowingly takes a toy that belongs to his sibling, we assume
that the child not only knows that he is taking something, but that he also
knows that what he is taking is a toy and that the toy belongs to his
sibling. If we say that someone knowingly ate a sandwich with cheese,
we normally assume that the person knew both that he was eating a
sandwich and that it contained cheese. 141
From these and other examples, the Court distilled a heretofore unremarked
rule of English usage: "In ordinary English, where a transitive verb has an object,
listeners in most contexts assume that an adverb (such as knowingly) that modifies
the transitive verb tells the listener how the subject performed the entire action,
including the object as set forth in the sentence."l 4 2 The Court's argument really
ends with the formulation of this rule. What remains of the opinion is just a series
of afterthoughts, most of them responses to government arguments.
In the first of these afterthoughts, the Court defended its account of English
usage as consistent with "[t]he manner in which the courts ordinarily interpret
criminal statutes."l43 The Court mentioned two of its own decisions in particular-
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.'" and Liparota v. United Statesl45-both
of which it characterized as "fully consistent" with the Court's account of English
137 Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1889 (2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1) (2006)).
138 Id. at 1888-89.




14 Id. at 1891.
'" 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
145 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
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usage. 14 6 This characterization is misleading, though. It is true enough that in each
case the Court interpreted the word "knowingly" to modify the offense element at
issue. In neither case, however, did the Court rely on grammar or usage. In
Liparota, the Court said that the statute's language was ambiguous: "[T]he words
themselves provide little guidance. Either interpretation would accord with
ordinary usage."1 4 7  Worse, in X-Citement Video the Court actually said the
grammar suggested the opposite reading: "The most natural grammatical reading .
. . suggests that the term 'knowingly' modifies only the surrounding verbs . .. "148
In Flores-Figueroa, then, the Court found clear guidance in a grammatical
structure that until then had been thought, by the Supreme Court and others, to be
ambiguous. It is possible that the Court in Flores-Figueroa really did identify a
usage rule that all those other courts, and all those prior incarnations of the
Supreme Court itself, had overlooked. But a more likely explanation is that the
statute's text just matters more to the Court than it used to.
The text matters, moreover, in a particular way. In Flores-Figueroa, the
Court's exclusive reliance on examples from everyday language-in preference to
examples from criminal statutes-suggests that the Court's approach to statutory
interpretation is not so much textualist as literalist. Professor Manning has
contrasted "modern textualists" with "their literalist predecessors in the 'plain
meaning' school."l49 Literalists, he says, "look exclusively for the 'ordinary
meaning' of words and phrases."150 Textualists, by comparison, "emphasize the
relevant linguistic community's (or sub-community's) shared understandings and
practices."15 1 In Flores-Figueroa, the Court ignored the "shared understandings
and practices" reflected in decisions like Liparota and X-Citement Video in favor
of ordinary-language analysis-in favor, that is, of asking what it means to "say
that someone knowingly ate a sandwich with cheese." 5 2
B. Criminal Law Doctrine as "Legal Cliche"
It is tempting to suppose that doctrine matters less under the Court's current
approach just because the text matters more; that doctrine has been displaced,
rather than affirmatively discounted. After all, to the degree that a court assigns
dispositive importance to the text's "plain meaning," as the Supreme Court did in
Flores-Figueroa, the court will have less occasion to advert to the background
principles of criminal law. Thus, we could say of Flores-Figueroa that the Court's
14 Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1891.
147 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424.
148 X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 68.
149 Manning, supra note 42, at 2456.
Iso Manning, supra note 97, at 434.
' Id.
152 Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1890 (2009).
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literalist interpretation of the text obviated resort to background principles-to the
presumption against strict liability, for example, or to the associated distinction
that formed the basis for Justice Sotomayor's decision in Figueroa.
But there is more at work in Flores-Figueroa than a newfound regard for the
text. Flores-Figueroa reflects, in addition, a kind of open hostility to criminal law
doctrine. This hostility is evident, first, in the Court's discussion of Liparota.
Again, the Court relied on Liparota for the proposition that "courts ordinarily read
a phrase in a criminal statute that introduces the elements of a crime with the word
'knowingly' as applying that word to each element." 53  Though the result in
Liparota was in fact driven by doctrine, rather than grammar, the Court in Flores-
Figueroa tried to convey the opposite impression. The Court depicted Liparota as
a triumph of ordinary usage over the doctrinal principle that "ignorance of the law
is no excuse."l 54 Along the way, the Court gratuitously dismissed this doctrinal
principle as a "legal cliche":
[I]n Liparota v. United States, this Court interpreted a federal food stamp
statute that said, "'whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or
possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized
by [law]"' is subject to imprisonment. The question was whether the
word "knowingly" applied to the phrase "in any manner not authorized
by [law]." The Court held that it did, despite the legal cliche "ignorance
of the law is no excuse." 55
The Court's account of X-Citement Video was equally revisionist.'56 The
statute at issue in X-Citement Video prohibited, among other things, the interstate
shipment of child pornography.5 7 The principal question in the case was whether
the statute's "knowingly" mental state extended to the fact that the performer was
underage.'58 The Court held that it did.'59 This result, though, was driven almost
entirely by doctrine-specifically, by the presumption that "elements that
criminalize otherwise innocent conduct" require a mental state.160 Nevertheless, in
Flores-Figueroa the Court's account of X-Citement Video made no reference to the
doctrinal basis for the decision.161 What is worse, the Court in Flores-Figueroa
5 Id at 1891 (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 79 (1994)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
154 id
1ss Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
156 See id.
' X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 67-68.
151 Id. at 68.
159 Id at 78.
1 Id. at 72.
161 See Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1891.
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affirmatively depicted the result in X-Citement Video as another defeat for criminal
law doctrine. This time, the denigrated doctrine was the one-time general rule that
no mental state attaches to the age element in sex crimes involving children.162
The Court said of X-Citement Video: "[T]he fact that many sex crimes involving
minors do not ordinarily require that a perpetrator know that his victim is a minor
supported the [g]overnment's [sic163] position. Nonetheless, we again found that
the intent element applied to 'the use of a minor."'1
The message of Flores-Figueroa is clear, especially in the Court's
gratuitous dismissal of the principle that "ignorance of the law is no excuse"- as a
"legal cliche." 65  The Court's vision of a criminal law written in "ordinary
English"'166 also is-not coincidentally-a vision of criminal law purged of
doctrine's taint. The text matters more because doctrine matters less.
Moreover, as Dean shows, doctrine matters less even when the text of the
statute does not, by itself, provide a clear answer to the interpretive question. In
Dean, the Court eventually did look behind the statute's text. It considered, among
other things, the fact that the discharge element in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) is
non-causal. 67  In deciding what significance to assign to this fact, though, the
Court scrupulously avoided any encounter with existing doctrine.
This aspect of the Court's analysis began with the observation that Congress
had used the passive voice in defining the discharge element. The statute-
instead of requiring that the defendant discharge the firearm-says that the
aggravated offense occurs if "the firearm is discharged." 69 From Congress's use
162 See id. For evidence of this rule, see Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n.8
(1952), recognizing that "[e]xceptions [to the presumption against strict liability] came to include sex
offenses, such as rape, in which the victim's actual age was determinative despite [the] defendant's
reasonable belief that the girl had reached [the] age of consent," and Francis Sayre, Public Welfare
Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 73-74 (1933), which discusses the exception to the presumption
against strict liability for crimes involving child sexual abuse.
163 In X-Citement Video, it was not the government that urged the Court to limit the scope of
the "knowingly" mental-state adverb. See Brief for the United States at 39, X-Citement Video, 513
U.S. 64 (No. 93-723) (asserting that "18 U.S.C. [§] 2252 [s]hould [b]e construed [t]o [riequire
[k]nowledge (tlhat [t]he [p]roduction [o]f [p]articular [m]aterials [i]nvolved [t]he [u]se [o]f [a]
[m]inor [e]ngaging [i]n [slexually [e]xplicit [c]onduct"). Rather, the argument for limiting the scope
of the mental-state adverb came from the defendant, who had persuaded the Ninth Circuit that the
statute, so construed, violated the First Amendment. See Respondents' Brief at 13, X-Citement
Video, 513 U.S. 64 (No. 93-723) (arguing that "[§] 2252 does not require knowledge of minority
status").
16 Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1891 (citing X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72 & n.2).
165 id
166 id
167 See Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (2009) (observing that "[iut is whether
something [i.e., the discharge] happened-not how or why it happened-that matters [under
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)]").
168 id.
169 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).
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of the passive voice, the Court inferred that the defendant need not cause the
firearm to discharge: "It is whether something happened-not how or why it
happened-that matters."170 From the fact that the defendant need not cause the
discharge, the Court inferred both that the discharge need not be intentional and,
more broadly, that the discharge element requires no mental state at all.' 7'
This argument, admittedly, gets behind the statute's text; it addresses the
nature of the discharge element in a way that touches on traditional criminal law
concerns.17 2 In making this argument, though, the Court pointedly ignored a vast
and hoary body of criminal law doctrine that speaks, first, to the distinction
between causal and non-causal elements and, second, to the relationship between
this distinction and culpability.'73 The critical premise of the Court's argument-
that non-causal elements require no mental state-was not even articulated, much
less supported by authority.174  The Court proceeded as if nobody ever had
considered before the distinction between causal and non-causal elements, or the
relationship between this distinction and culpability.
IV. How DEAN AND FLORES-FIGUEROA ILLUSTRATE SHORTCOMINGS IN THE
STATUTE-CENTERED APPROACH TO CRIMINAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In this section, I will argue, tentatively, that Justice Sotomayor's doctrine-
centered approach to criminal statutory interpretation deserves to prevail. My
argument will have two parts. First, I will use Flores-Figueroa to show that
dispensing with criminal law background principles is easier said than done-that
even the supposedly unambiguous text of the statute at issue in Flores-Figueroa
fails adequately to define the relationship between the statute's mental state and its
objective elements. Second, I will use Dean to show how the turn to doctrine
might improve the courts' reasoning in cases where they look behind the text, to
the statute's purposes and to the policies at stake.
A. Why Dispensing With Doctrine is Easier Said Than Done
In Flores-Figueroa, the Court. appeared to acknowledge that the rules of
"ordinary English grammar"'75 would not always define the scope of a criminal
statute's mental-state adverb.'76 Some sentences in criminal statutes, the Court
170 Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1853.
7' Id.
172 See MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAw 202-205 (1993).
173 See infra text accompanying notes 202-05.
174 See Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1853-54.
1s Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1890 (2009).
176 Id. at 1891.
2010] 143
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMTNAL LAW
said, "involve special contexts."l 77 But the Court said, referring to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1), that "[n]o special context is present here."]78  And so the
interpretation of this statute, at least, is controlled by ordinary usage. The mental-
state adverb "knowingly," the Court implied, modifies "the full object of the
transitive verb in the sentence."l 79
Only it doesn't, or so I will argue here. In this section, I will try to show
that the Court's approach to criminal statutory interpretation does not work even
with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) itself. Specifically, I will try to show that,
despite the absence in § 1028A(a)(1) of any "special context," the relationship
between the statute's mental-state adverb and the "full object of the [statute's]
transitive verb"' 80 cannot be understood except with the help of criminal law
background principles. I will focus on one background principle in particular,
namely, the one dismissed by the Court in Flores-Figueroa as a "legal cliche"-
the principle that "ignorance of the law is no excuse." 8'
Suppose the defendant, Flores-Figueroa, decides to raise the following
argument on remand to the district court. As interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Flores-Figueroa, the word "knowingly" in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) applies "to all
the subsequently listed elements of the crime."' 8 2  Among those subsequently
listed elements is the requirement that the thing "transfer[red], possess[ed], or
use[d]" by the defendant be a "means of identification." 83 In order to be guilty of
the offense, then, the defendant must "know" that the thing transferred, possessed,
or used "is a 'means of identification."'l 84 As it turns out, the phrase "means of




182 Id. at 1890.
' 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006).
184 Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1890 ("It makes little sense to read the provision's language
as heavily penalizing a person who 'transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority' a
something, but does not know, at the very least, that the 'something' (perhaps inside a box) is a
means of identification."').
18 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d) (2006) defines the term "means of identification" as follows:
(7) the term "means of identification" means any name or number that may be used,
alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual,
including any-
(A) name, social security number, date of birth, official State or government
issued driver's license or identification number, alien registration number,
government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number;
(B) unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris
image, or other unique physical representation;
(C) unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code; or
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identification" depends on whether it satisfies the statutory definition. If, as seems
likely, Flores-Figueroa was not familiar with the statutory definition, then he could
not have known that the thing he transferred, possessed, or used really qualified as
a "means of identification." So he is not guilty of the offense, regardless of
whether he knew the thing belonged to someone else.
Ordinary usage does not provide an answer to this argument. In ordinary
usage, knowing what something is often requires knowledge of what words mean,
particularly where terms of art-like "means of identification"-are concerned.
Were we to say of someone, "He didn't know that his knife was a butterfly knife,"
we might mean that he didn't know about the physical characteristics that made the
knife a "butterfly knife."' 86 But we might also mean that he didn't know what the
term "butterfly knife" means. Likewise, were we to say of someone, "She didn't
know that the defendant had acted with malice aforethought," we might mean that
she hadn't realized that the defendant intended, say, to inflict grievous bodily
injury. But we might also mean that she had not realized that the intent to inflict
grievous bodily injury qualifies as malice aforethought.
This very kind of ambiguity arises sometimes in firearms cases. Criminal
statutes defining the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm generally
require the government to prove that the defendant "knowingly possess[ed] any
firearm." 87 Defendants charged with this offense sometimes argue that they had
not realized that the thing they possessed satisfied the legal definition of "firearm,"
and so they could not have "knowingly" possessed a firearm. 8 1 In State v.
Dolsby,189 for example, where the felon-in-possession charge was based on the
defendant's possession of a "muzzle loader," the defendant, Dolsby, argued that
"he thought the muzzle loader was not legally considered a firearm."'90 Dolsby's
argument has a basis in ordinary English usage. There is a sense in which Dolsby
(if he was telling the truth) really did not knowingly possess a firearm.
(D) telecommunication identifying information or access device (as defined
in section 1029(e)).
18 A "butterfly knife" is a folding pocket knife with a two-part handle that folds around the
blade and is secured by a latch. See People v. Quattrone, 260 Cal. Rptr. 44, 45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(describing the "butterfly knife sold by defendant" in the case). When the latch is released, the "two
halves of the sheath ... swing down on pivots to form a handle exposing the blade." Id.
187 Harris v. State, 137 P.3d 124, 127 (Wyo. 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 6-8-102 (2005)). For another example of such a criminal statute, see ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.61.200(a)(1) (2008), providing that a person commits the offense of weapons misconduct in the
third degree if he:
[K]nowingly possesses a firearm capable of being concealed on one's person after having
been convicted of a felony or adjudicated a delinquent minor for conduct that would
constitute a felony if committed by an adult by a court of this state, a court of the United
States, or a court of another state or territory.
188 See, e.g., State v. Dolsby, 145 P.3d 917, 920 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006); Harris, 137 P.3d at
130-31.
189 145 P.3d 917 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006).
190 Id. at 920 (emphasis omitted).
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This is not to say, of course, that arguments like Dolsby's have carried the
day. Courts have rejected arguments like Dolsby's out of hand. 191 They have
interpreted the statutes to require, in effect, only that the defendant have
"knowledge of the relevant physical characteristics"' 92-the physical
characteristics that bring the object possessed within the scope of the statute.193
The reason for this interpretation, though, has nothing to do with ordinary usage
and everything to do with criminal law doctrine. It has to do, in particular, with an
important instantiation of the principle that "ignorance of the law is no excuse"-
namely, the background rule that "[n]either knowledge nor recklessness or
negligence . . . as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining
the elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless . . . the [statute] so
provides."l94
The same background rule is necessary as an aid to defining the scope of the
mental-state adverb in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), despite the Court's insistence in
Flores-Figueroa that "[n]o special context is present here."195 It is unclear, in the
end, exactly what this statute requires by way of knowledge that the object
transferred, possessed, or used is a "means of identification." It might be read
simply to require that the defendant know that the thing used, transferred, or
possessed fits the description of one of the things mentioned in the statutory
definition, such as a "date of birth" or a "social security number."'96 Or it might be
read to require that the defendant know, in addition, that the thing used,
transferred, or possessed qualifies, in the usual colloquial sense, as a "means of
identification." But the statute cannot plausibly be read to require that the
defendant know that the object falls within the statutory definition of "means of
identification," despite the viability of this reading from the perspective of
See Dolsby, 145 P.3d at 920; Harris, 137 P.3d at 130-31 (though statute required proof that
convicted felon "knowingly" possessed a firearm, it was not a defense that "he did not think the black
powder rifle was considered a firearm due to the information obtained from the store clerk and
deputy and the fact that he was able to purchase the gun from a retail store without being subject to a
background check"); see also People v. Berrier, 637 N.Y.S.2d 69, 69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
("Knowledge that the thing possessed answers the description of one of the prohibited instruments is
not an element of third-degree criminal possession of a weapon.").
192 People v. Small, 598 N.Y.S.2d 431, 435 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993); see also id. at 432, 436
(citation omitted) (holding that state statute prohibiting the possession of stun guns required the
government to prove that "the defendant was aware of possessing the alleged weapon and was aware
of the physical characteristics of the object which distinguish it as a weapon within the meaning of
the statute").
1 Cf Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 524-25 (1994) (in prosecution
under federal statute prohibiting the interstate sale of "drug paraphernalia," the government "need not
prove specific knowledge that the items [sold] are 'drug paraphernalia' within the meaning of the
statute" as "it is sufficient for the [g]overrnent to show that the defendant 'knew the character and
nature of the materials' with which he dealt").
194 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(9) (1985).
1 Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1891 (2009).
196 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7)(A) (2006).
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"ordinary English usage." The rules of ordinary English usage do not suffice to
define the relationship between the statute's mental-state adverb and its objective
elements.
B. How Doctrine Helps Courts Interpret Incomplete Statutes
At least where statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) are concerned, then,
criminal statutory interpretation requires something more than rules of ordinary
English grammar.197 But why turn to criminal law doctrine, rather than, say, a
statute-specific, a-doctrinal analysis of the policies at stake? For example, could
not a court resolve the ambiguity I identified in the last section-whether 18
U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) requires knowledge of the statutory definition of "means of
identification"-merely on the basis of the common-sense observation that the
statute, so interpreted, would be unworkable? What does the interjection of
doctrinal jargon, or "legal clich6," really add to the analysis?
There probably are deep reasons-and maybe even constitutional reasons-
why reliance on "well-settled background norms"198 as a guide to criminal
statutory interpretation is preferable to ad hoc, statute-specific policy analysis. In
this section, though, I will limit myself to a shallow, pragmatic argument-namely,
that resort to criminal law doctrine improves the way courts answer questions left
unanswered by the text. It does so by establishing a connection to practical
wisdom accumulated in past criminal cases and other statutes. I will use Dean v.
United States'99 as the vehicle for this argument.
In Dean, again, the Court did not rely solely on English grammar as the
basis for its interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)A)(iii); it also relied on a brief
analysis of the nature of the discharge element. From Congress's use of the
passive voice in defining the discharge element of section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), the
Court inferred that the defendant need not cause the firearm to discharge: "It is
whether something happened-not how or why it happened-that matters."2 00
197 See Manning, supra note 42 (acknowledging that sometimes criminal statutes "do[] not
spell out every detail").
198 Id. at 2468.
'99 129 S. Ct. 1849 (2009).
200 Id. at 1853. It is possible to question even the Court's classification of the discharge
element as non-causal. The Model Penal Code contemplates, as do many state criminal codes, that
some words in criminal statutes will describe not "results" or "circumstances" but, rather, "conduct."
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9) (1985) (providing that phrase "element of an offense"
encompasses conduct elements, attendant-circumstance elements, and result elements); see also, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(5) (Supp. 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 32 (Supp. 2009).
Dean's attorney could have argued plausibly that, despite Congress's use of the passive voice, the
discharge element is a conduct element, rather than a result or circumstance element. If Congress had
meant the element to operate as a circumstance or result, it would have said not "the firearm is
discharged," but rather "the firearm discharges" (circumstance) or "the defendant causes the firearm
to discharge" (result). Cf MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.327 (West 2004) (emphasis omitted)
(providing that a person commits the offense of "[d]eath due to explosives" when he carries an
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Then, from the fact that the defendant need not cause the firearm to discharge, the
Court inferred both that the discharge need not be intentional and, more broadly,
that the discharge element requires no mental state at all.20 1
Criminal law doctrine has a name for elements that hinge only on "whether
something happened-not why or how it happened." These elements are known as
"circumstance" elements. This distinction-between causal and circumstance
elements-has been around at least since Bentham,202 and plays an important part
in the Model Penal Code, which distinguishes "result" elements from "attendant
circumstance[]" elements.20 3 Under the Model Penal Code, a condition or event is
a "result" element if the government must prove that the defendant caused the
condition or event to exist or occur. 204 By contrast, if the government need not
prove that the defendant caused the condition or event to exist or occur, the
element is an "attendant circumstance[]" element.205
In Dean, of course, the Court spotted the distinction even without the help of
the criminal law's terminology of "result" and "circumstance." What difference
would it have made, then, if the Court had invoked this terminology? The answer
is that putting a name to the relevant distinction might have connected the Court to
a body of criminal law doctrine, and this body of doctrine might have informed the
Court's use of the distinction. Criminal law doctrine associated with the
distinction between result and circumstance elements casts light on both inferences
drawn by the Court from its determination that the discharge element is non-
explosive substance onto a public conveyance and the "explosive substance explodes and destroys
human life"). In both of these two alternative formulations, the discharge is something the gun does.
In the statutory phrase "the firearm is discharged," by contrast, the discharge is something that
someone does to the gun; it is conduct, in other words. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). At
most, Congress's use of the passive voice in § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) indicates that the person doing the
discharging-the person engaging in the proscribed conduct-need not be the defendant. See id.
201 Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1853-54.
202 See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 88 (Prometheus
Books 1988) (1781).
203 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9) (1985).
204 See id. § 1.13(9)(iii) (describing this kind of element as "result of conduct"); id. §
2.02(2)(b)(ii) (describing element as "a result of his [the actor's] conduct"); id. § 2.03(1) (defining
causation by identifying the conditions under which "[c]onduct is the cause of a result"); see also
Paul H. Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A Top Ten List, 1 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 225,
238 (1997) (arguing that the "spirit and intention" of the Code's drafters can best be captured by
defining "result" element to mean any element that must be caused by the defendant's conduct).
205 Schwartz G. Abrams, Comment on Proof and Presumptions: Section 103, in I WORKING
PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 11, 12 n.* (1970)
(explaining that the phrase "attendant circumstances" was intended to capture elements "which,
although not truly 'conduct,' are nevertheless required to be proved [sic] the requirement that the
person bribed be a 'public servant,' for example, or that the espionage take place in time of war").
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causal-its inference that the element "does not require proof of intent," 20 6 and its
inference that the element requires no mental state at all.207
First, criminal law doctrine vindicates the Court's inference that "subsection
(iii) [of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)] does not require proof of intent." 20 8 Doctrine
teaches that criminal statutes rarely require proof that the actor acted intentionally
with respect to circumstance elements-an actor usually need not "intend a
circumstance." 20 9 This teaching is reflected in state criminal codes, many of which
permit the mental state of purposely or intentionally to be assigned only to result
and conduct elements-not to circumstance elements. 210 New York's penal law is
206 Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1853.
207 id
208 Id.
209 S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1975, at 54
n.13 (Comm. Print 1975) ("[T]he absence [from the draft federal criminal code] of the mental state
'intentional' in reference to an existing circumstance is based on the definition of intentional. One
can intend or determine to engage in conduct or to cause a result but cannot 'intend' a
circumstance."). Philosophers and lawyers disagree about why, exactly, the mental state of
intentionally does not ordinarily attach to circumstance elements. Bentham argued simply that "the
circumstances [of an act] are no objects of the intention." BENTHAM, supra note 202. The drafters of
the proposed federal criminal code reached the same conclusion: "One can intend or determine to
engage in conduct or to cause a result but cannot 'intend' a circumstance." S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1975, at 54 n.13 (Comm. Print 1975).
Michael Moore has argued, however, that the reason why the mental state of intentionally does not
ordinarily attach to circumstance elements is a moral one, rather than a psychological or semantic
one. See MOORE, supra note 172, at 204. Where circumstance elements are concerned, he argues
that knowledge and intent are equally culpable, and so it would make little sense specifically to
require intent, as distinguished from knowledge. Id.
210 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-3(11) (2009) ("A person acts 'intentionally' with respect
to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to
cause such result or to engage in such conduct."); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-4 (2008) ("A person
intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by
the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result
or engage in that conduct."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.616(1) (West 2010) ("A person acts
intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his
conscious objective is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct."); Mo. REv. STAT. §
562.016(2) (2000) ("A person 'acts purposely', or with purpose, with respect to his conduct or to a
result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result.")
(emphasis omitted); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(65) (2009) ("[A] person acts purposely with
respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense if it is the person's
conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
626:2(II)(a) (2007) ("A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when
his conscious object is to cause the result or engage in the conduct that comprises the element.");
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(1) (McKinney 2009) ("A person acts intentionally with respect to a result
or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause such
result or to engage in such conduct.") OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(7) (2009) ("'Intentionally' or 'with
intent,' when used with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense,
means that a person acts with a conscious objective to cause the result or to engage in the conduct so
described."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(18) (Supp. 2009) ("'Intentional' means that a person
acts intentionally with respect to the nature of the conduct or to a result of the conduct when it is the
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representative.21 1 Its definition of "intentionally" provides that "[a] person acts
intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining
an offense when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such
conduct." 2 12  It makes no provision for situations where the mental state of
intentionally is assigned to circumstance elements, and so it tacitly precludes this
213
assignment.
If doctrine would have vindicated the Court's inference that the discharge
element does not require "intent," though, it would have undercut the Court's
broader inference that the discharge requires no mental state at all. The fact that a
particular element is a circumstance tells us nothing about whether a mental state
other than intentionally-knowingly, for example, or recklessly-is required by
21421the statute. This is evident in the Model Penal Code,215 the draft federal criminal
code,216 and even in the Supreme Court's own decisions.217 Consider, for example,
Staples v. United States, 2 18 where the Court was called upon to interpret a federal
person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result."); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (West 2003) ("A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(1) (LexisNexis 2008) ("A
person engages in conduct . . . [i]ntentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.")
211 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(1) (McKinney 2009).
212 id
213 Interestingly, other states have adopted even narrower definitions of "intentionally," which
permit this mental state to be assigned only to result elements. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
11.81.900(a)(1) (2008) (providing that "a person acts 'intentionally' with respect to a result described
by a provision of law defining an offense when the person's conscious objective is to cause that
result"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-501(5) (2009) ("A person acts 'intentionally' or 'with intent' when
his conscious objective is to cause the specific result proscribed by the statute defining the offense.").
214 Dean argued that a mental state of knowingly was appropriate. See Brief for the Petitioner
at 26, Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849 (2009) (No. 08-5274). One federal court of appeals had
concluded, in substance, that a reckless mental state was appropriate. See United States v. Brown,
449 F.3d 154, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2006), abrogated by Dean, 129 S. Ct. 1849.
215 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (1985) (providing that "a person is not guilty of an
offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with
respect to each material element of the offense").
216 See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1975, at
59 (Comm. Print 1975) (explaining that under proposed federal criminal code, "[w]here a state of
mind does not immediately introduce an actus reus element of an offense, the state of mind which
must be proved with respect to conduct is knowing and to an existing circumstance or a result is
reckless").
217 See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 65-66 (1994) (interpreting
federal statute to require proof that the defendant knew the performers in pornographic movie were
underage); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 602, 619 (1994) (interpreting federal statute to
require proof that the defendant knew the firearm in his possession was fully automatic).
218 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
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criminal statute prohibiting the possession of an unregistered machinegun. 21 9 The
question in Staples was whether the statute, which was silent with respect to mens
rea, should nevertheless be interpreted to require proof that the defendant knew the
gun was capable of functioning as a machinegun.22o The objective element at issue
in Staples-the gun's capacity to fire automatically-obviously was a
circumstance element; the statute was indifferent to whether the defendant himself
had caused the gun to be capable of firing automatically. 22 1 Still, the Court held
that this element required a mental state of knowingly.222
Dean illustrates how doctrine enables courts to learn from experience.
Under a doctrine-centered approach to statutory interpretation, the Court's
identification of the discharge element as a circumstance would have fostered an
encounter with a vast body of accumulated wisdom-from Bentham through
Herbert Wechsler, and encompassing finally even the Court's own decisions. The
Court might have concluded nevertheless that the discharge element did not
require a mental state. It might have refined its explanation of the critical
inference-perhaps by identifying a reason why this particular circumstance
element requires no mental state.223 It could not, however, have reasoned as it did
under a doctrine-centered approach. In the light cast by experience, the Court's
inference-from the mere fact that the discharge is non-causal to the conclusion
that the discharge requires no mental state-is plainly wrong.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Sotomayor's opinion for the Second Circuit in Figueroa has
shortcomings of its own, of course. But the problems with Figueroa have less to
do with Justice Sotomayor's method-which is fundamentally sound, I think-
than with the poverty of her conception of the criminal law background. The
criminal law offers more, and better, tools for classifying elements than the
distinction between "elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct" 224 and
elements that make criminal conduct more serious. 225
A better tool for classifying elements was at work in Justice Stevens's
dissenting opinion in Dean, for example. Justice Stevens would have held that the
219 Id. at 602, 604.
220 id.
221 Id. at 602.
222 Id. at 619.
223 Cf State v. Andrews, 27 P.3d 137, 141 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a circumstance
element requires a mental state if and only if it "transforms otherwise innocent conduct into
criminally culpable conduct").
224 United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994).
225 See, e.g., id. at 73 (identifying "the age of the performers" in child pornography statute as
an "element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct").
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discharge element in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) requires a mental state. 226 In
support of this conclusion, he offered a not-quite-novel refinement of the
distinction between elements that make conduct criminal and elements that make
227
criminal conduct more serious.22 The real distinction, he said, is between
elements that measure "the seriousness of the harm caused by the predicate act"
and elements that measure instead the degree of risk posed by the defendant's
conduct-elements like the discharge element in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), for
example.228 Elements of this second kind, he argued, usually cannot justify
increased punishment unless the government is required to prove an associated
mental state.22 9 Elements of the first kind sometimes can.230
This is not the place to defend Justice Stevens's refinement of the
presumption against strict liability. I mention Justice Stevens's argument only
because it illustrates what I like best about the doctrine-centered approach to
criminal statutory interpretation-namely, its promise of progress in criminal law.
In the preexisting doctrinal distinction between elements that make conduct
criminal and elements that make crimes worse, Justice Stevens found a kernel of
truth-namely, that elements "permit[ting] increased punishment based on the
seriousness of the harm" sometimes do not require mental states.23 1 But he was
able to perceive, in the context of the Dean case, a critical limitation on the
preexisting principle-namely, that elements designed to measure the magnitude
of risk usually require mental states, even if they only make the actor's crime
worse.232
Not only, then, does doctrine inform the resolution of current cases by
connecting the courts to what others have said about the same topic. The
encounter with doctrine in the context of particular cases promotes the gradual
refinement of doctrine and so promotes the just resolution of future cases. By
226 Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1857, 1860 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227 Id. at 1859. 1 say "not-quite-novel" because this distinction closely tracks the traditional
distinction between elements that define the "proscribed act" and elements that define an "additional
consequence." People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 378 (Cal. 1969) (using this distinction to define the
derivative distinction between general-intent crimes and specific-intent crimes). Since "proscribed
act" encompasses every objective element that falls short of the ultimate harm at which the statute is
targeted, see, e.g., People v. Overman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 798, 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), it
encompasses, in effect, everything that makes the conduct riskier. In contrast, an element will count
as an "additional consequence" if it measures the social harm at which the statute is targeted. See,
e.g., People v. Hesslink, 213 Cal. Rptr. 465, 470-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the element of
"obtain[ing] property of another" in extortion statute qualified as an "additional consequence").




232 Cf FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 115 (2009) (explaining that the idea behind the common law is that the "courts will
sometimes perceive in the context of a particular case that the preexisting rule is in need of large-
scale change or small-scale modification").
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contrast, the majority's decisions in Dean and Flores-Figueroa, just as they say
nothing about criminal law's past, contribute nothing to criminal law's future,
either.233
233 Flores-Figueroa, which was decided just five days after Dean, does not cite Dean, despite
the striking similarity of the issues in the two cases.
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